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GEORGE HUNTINGTON HARTFORD II, Petitioner, T.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; EDWARD BARTON COLT, a Minor,
etc., Real Party in Interest.
[1] Process-Defects and Remedies-Motion to Quash-Mandamus.
-The purpose of Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1, 416.3, is to permit a

defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his
person by motion to quash or writ of mandate without waiving
his right to defend on the merits by permitting a default to be
entered against him while the jurisdictional issue is being
determined, and to achieve such purpose, when relief has been
denied in the trial court, it is necessary that relief be sought
in the appellate court before the time to plead has expired,
since otherwise defendant would be compelled to elect between
permitting the entry of a default or waiving the jurisdictional
issue by pleading to the merits.
[2] ld.-Defects and Remedies-Motion to Quash-Mandamus.When Code Civ. Proc., §§ 416.1,416.3, setting forth the procedure of attacking jurisdiction of the person of defendant by
motion to quash or writ of mandate, are construed together,
they provide alternative methods of securing an additional
20-day period to petition for a writ of mandate, and failure to
secure an extension under § 416.3 does not preclude issuance
of the writ if the petition is filed within the time permitted
to plead under § 416.1.
[8] ld.-Service by Publication-Construction of Statute.-As
used in Code Civ. Proe., § 417, declaring that where jurisdiction
is acquired over a person who is outside this state by publica.
ation of summons in accordance with §§ 412, 413, the ClOurt
shall have power to render a personal judgment against such
person only if he was personally served with a Clopy of the
summons and was a "resident" of this state at the time of
commencement of the action or at the time of service, the word
"resident" means "domiciliary," so that where defendant was
Dot at any relevant time a domiciliary of this state, § 417
precludes personal judgment against him.
,

[1] See Ca1.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 72.
[8] See Ca1.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 27 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Process, § 90 et seq.
Jl[cK:. Dig. References: [1,2] Process, §72; [8] Process, 528;
: [(.12] IDegitimacy, § 17.5I
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[4] IDegitimacy-Declaration of Parental Relation.-A proceeding
under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that defendant
is plaintiff's father, is not necessarily classified as one in rem,
particularly if such classification would result in making the
judgmen~ binding as to the status of the parties in subsequent
litigation between them or others; the purpose of the particular action brought under such section must be considered to
determine how it should be characterized.
[5] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Under Civ. Code, § 231.
providing for declarations of existence or nonexistence of the
relation of parent and child by birth or adoption, the state
may adjudicate the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship between its domiciliary and a person not subject to its
jurisdiction if adequate notice is provided, but the severing
of a relationship or an adjudication that it never existed for
the purpose of establishing the parties' freedom from it in the
future is not the same thing as creating it or establishing its
present existence; the basic difference is between the state's
power to insulate its domiciliary from a relationship with one
not within its jurisdiction and its lack of power to reach out
aild fasten a relationship on a person over whom it has DO
jurisdiction.
[6] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-If the purpose of an
action under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that
defendant is plaintiff's father were to enforce r. duty of support
or some other personal obligation growing out of the parentchild relationship, personal jurisdiction over defendant would
be essential.
[7] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The requirement of
personal jurisdiction over defendant, in an action brought
under Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that he is plaintift's father, cannot be avoided by limiting the relief sought
to a binding declaration of the parties' status, since such an
adjudication would prevent relitigation of the basic issue on
which defendant's personal obligations to plaintiff must rest and
to that extent would necessarily constitute a personal judgment against him.
[8] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The fact that it may
appear unlikely that plaintiff, suing to secure a declaration
that defendant is his father, will ever have occasion to assert
any personal rights against defendant based on the claimed
relationship between them cannot justify giving any judgment
that might be obtained an eftect to which it would otherwise
not be entitled.
[8] ld.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Even when it is not
res judicata, a determination of pedigree may constitute evidence of the facts adjudicated, and such a determination mar
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be sufficient to satisfy governmental authorities that require
for one purpose or another satisfactory evidence of birth and
identity.
[10] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-The fact that a determinlltion of pedigree might be used in subsequent litigation
would not constitute a denial of due process.
[l1] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-Civ. Code, § 231, providing for declarations of existence or nonexistence of the
relation of parent and child by birth or adoption, may not
reasonably be interpreted as authorizing an action to secure a
judgment the effect of which would necessarily be limited to
constituting evidence of the facts adjudicated.
[12] Id.-Declaration of Parental Relation.-In an action under
Civ. Code, § 231, to secure a declaration that defendant is
plaintiff's father, the judgment could not be res judicata in
whole or in part in the absence of personal jurisdiction over
defendant, and it could not conclusively adjudicate the future
relationship of the parties to one another.

)

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County to enter an order quashing service of
summons. Writ granted.
Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin for Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, William E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, David Mix and Thomas H.
Carver, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Bernard B. Cohen and Henry S. Cohen for Real Party in
Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 30, 1955, plaintiff, by his
guardian ad litem, commenced an action pursuant to Civil
Code, section 231, 1 to secure a declaration that defendant is
his father. In his verified complaint he alleged that he
is 17 years old and that since he was 10 days old he has
been in the exclusive care and custody of his grandmother
with whom he resides. For more than eight years plaintiff
and his grandmother have been domiciled in Los Angeles
County, California, "and during all of said time have been
and now are residents of and physically present in said
1" An action may be brought for the purpose of having declared the
existence or nonexistence between the parties of the relation of parent
and child, by birth or adoption."

ffl Cold-II
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County and State." Plaintiff was born in New York in
1938, the child of his mother and defendant, who were never
married. His mother died in 1941. To conceal the fact that
plaintiff was his natural child, defendant directed that the
names of plaintiff's grandmother and stepgrandfather be
entered as his parents on his birth certificate, and this was
done. Defendant has always "exhibited sincere interest in
and concern for the welfare of plaintiff," and has visited him
in California when he has been in the state in connection
with businesses he maintains here. HE: established a trust
fund of which plaintiff is beneficiary and from which his guardian receives an income of over $800 per month for plaintiff's
care and maintenance, and ultimately plaintiff will receive
the corpus of the trust, which is now worth more than
$375,000. Accordingly, "it is not necessary for defendant
to payor contribute any money or anything else toward
plaintiff's support." Shortly before the commencement of
this action, defendant ., for the first time denied, and he now
denies that he is the natural father of plaintiff and denies
that the relationship of parent and child exists between
them. .. Defendant came to California on July 10. 1955, on
a business trip but left on August 31, 1955, on learning
that plaintiff intended to file this action. Plaintiff finally
alleges that although he "is identified on his birth certificate
as 'Edward Barton Colt,' for many years last past plaintiff
bas refrained from using the surname 'Colt' and bas used
only the name 'Edward Barton.' Plaintiff has obtained a
Federal Social Security number under the name of 'Edward
Barton,' and is registered in school and for many years has
been and now is known among his friends and acquaintances
as 'Edward Barton.' In the near future, plaintiff expects
to become a member of the United States Armed Forces, and
also intends to apply for a passport so that he may travel
abroad. Considerable confusion has resulted and will result
from plaintiff's use of the name 'Edward Barton' when he is
identified on his birth certificate as 'Edward Barton Colt.'
Moreover, because his birth certifiCate falsely states that
John Colt is his father, and plaintiff is identified thereon
as 'Edward Barton Colt,' it is impossible for plaintiff legally
to establish his true identity or that of his true father. It
is therefore necessary that it be judicially determined that
defendant George Huntington Hartford, II, is the natural
father of plaintiff and that the relation of parent and child
exists between them, so that hereafter plaintiff will have no
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difficulty legally establishing the true identity of himself and
his father, especially when he enters the Armed Forces and
when he applies for a passport." The complaint concludes
with the prayer that "the court by its decree adjudge that
defendant is the natural father of plaintiff, and that the relation of parent and child exists between plaintiff and defendant . . . . "
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 412, plaintiff
secured an order for service by publication based on an affidavit stating that defendant resides outside of the state, and
defendant was personally served in the State of New York.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 413.) The order for service by publication provided that it was" applicable only to that portion of
the relief prayed for in the complaint which is based on an
action •in rem.' "
On January 6,1956, defendant appeared specially and made
a motion for an order quashing service. Affidavits were filed
in support of and in opposition to the motion, which was
denied on January 11th. The order of denial also provided:
"Pursuant to stipulation defendant is allowed 30 days to
answer or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint." On
February 9th, defendant filed this petition for a writ of mandate to compel the court to enter its order quashing the service
of summons.
The procedure for attacking the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of defendant by motion to quash the writ of
mandate is now set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, sections
416.1' and 416.38 , which were enacted in 1955.
•Any defendant or cross-defendant upon whom service of summons
has been made may serve and 111e, on or before the last day on whieb

he is required to plead, or within BUch further time as the eourt may
for good cause allow, a notice of motion to quash the service of summons,
upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him. . . . In
the event of the service and filing of such motion, the time of the moving
party to plead to the complaint or cross-complaint shall be extended, and
no default may be entered against him, until the expiration of 10 days
following service upon him of written notice of entry of an order of
the court denying the motion. Upon good cause being shown, the conrt
may extend the latter 10-day period for an adiitional period not ueeeding 20 days. Neither an application to the court by any defendant
or cross-defendant for an extension of time within which to plead, nor
the granting of such extension nor entering into a stipulation of the
parties for sueb pxtension, shall constitute a general appearance by said
defendant or cross-defendant."
"'If a motion of a defendant or cross-defendant to quash service of
summons, as provided in section 416.1 of this code, is denied by the
court, he may, before pleading and within 10 days after service upon
him of written notice of the order of the court denying the motion, or
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Since in the present case written notice of the court's order
denying the motion to quash service was served on January
12th and since defendant's petition for a writ of mandate
was not filed/until 18 days later and no extension pursuant
to section 416.3 was obtained, plaintiff contends that the writ
was filed too late. Defendant contends, however, that he
sufficiently complied with the statute by filing his petition
within the 30 days allowed him under section 416.1 to .. answer
or otherwise plead to plaintiff's complaint."
[1] The obvious purpose of sections 416.1 and 416.3 is to
permit a defendant to challenge the jurisdiction of the court
over his person without waiving his right to defend on the
merits by permitting a default to be entered against him
while the jurisdictional issue is being determined. (See 1
Witkin, California Procedure, 1955 Statutory Supplement,
17-19.) To achieve this purpose, when relief has been denied
in the trial court, it is necessary that relief be sought in the
appellate court before the time to plead has expired. Otherwise the defendant would be compelled to elect between permitting the entry of a default or waiving the jurisdictional
issue by pleading to .the merits. [2] If, however, the writ is
filed in the appellate court within the additional 20-day period
permitted to plead in the trial court under section 416.1, no
purpose would be served by requiring the defendant to duplicate the 20·day extension secured under section 416.1 by
securing a concurrent extension under section 416.3. Accordingly, when the two sections are construed together, it
is apparent that they provide alternative methods of securing
an additional 20-day period to petition for a writ of mandate
and that a failure to secure an extension under the provisions
of section 416.3 does not preclude issuance of the writ, if the
petition is filed within the time permitted to plead under
section 416.1.
Defendant contends that the relief sought by plaintiff is
necessarily a personal judgment against him and that since
he is not a California domiciliary (see Milliken v. Meyer, 311
within such additional time not exceeding 20 days as the court may allow,
petition an appropriate appellate court for a writ of mandate directed
to the court wherein the action or proceeding is pending requiring the
entry of its order quashing the service of summons. If he shall thereupon serve npon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the latter
court a notice that he has petitioned for such writ of mandate, his time
to plead shall be extended, and no defnult may be entered against him,
for a period of 10 days following written notice of the final judgment
in the mandamus proceeding, which time for good cause may be extended
by the court for an additional period of not to exceed 20 days."

Dec. 1956]

HARTFORD

v.

SUPERIOR COURT

[47 C.2d 447; 304 P.2d 1)

)

453

U.S. 457 [61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, 132 A.L.R. 1357]), it
would deny him due process of law to sustain the service of
process made outside the state. It is unnecessary to decide
whether any constitutional basis other than domicile may exist
in this case for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendant
by process served elsewhere. (See Ehrenzweig, Personal
Jurisdiction, 65 Yale L.J. 289; Ehrenzweig and Mills, Personal
Service, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 383.) [3] Code of Civil Procedure,
section 417, provides that "Where jurisdiction is acquired
over a person who is outside of this State by publication of
summons in accordance with Sections 412 and 413, the court
shall have the power to render a personal judgment against
such person only if he was personally served with a copy
of the summons and complaint, and was a resident of this
State at the time of the commencement of the action or at
the time of service." Since the term resident in this statute
means domiciliary (Smith v. Smith, 45 Ca1.2d 235, 240 [288
P.2d 497]), and since it is undisputed that defendant was not
at any time relevant herein a domiciliary of California, section 417 precludes the entry of a personal judgment against
him.
[4] Plaintiff contends that since the purpose of the proceeding is only to establish the status of the parties as parent
and child, it is a proceeding in rem and that therefore personal service within the state is not required. He argues that
the state of his domicile has sufficient interest in his status
as defendant's child to adjudicate that status without securing personal jurisdiction over defendant. We do not believe, .
however, that because the present proceeding is concerned
solely with status it must necessarily be classified as a proceeding in rem, particularly if such a classification would
result in making the judgment binding as to the status of the
parties in subsequent litigation between them or others. The
purpose of the particular action brought under Civil Code,
section 231, must be considered to determine how it should
be characterized.
[5] That section provides for declarations of both the
existence and nonexistence of the relation of parent and child
by birth or adoption, and a distinction may reasonably be
drawn between a proceeding to establish that the defendant
is not the plaintiff's parent and one to establish that he is.
By analogy to the rule applicable to ex parte divorces, it
could reasonably be contended that the state may adjudicate

454

HARTFORD tI. SUPERIOR COURT

[47 C.2d

the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship between its
domiciliary and a perSOll not subject to its jurisdiction if
adequate notice is provided. (See Williams v. North Caro·
lina, 317 U.s. 287, 303 [63 S.Ct. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R.
1273] ; Bing Gee v. Chan Lai ¥ung Gee, 89 Cal.App.2d 877.
884 [202 P.2d 360]; E.~tate of Smith, 86 Cal.App.2d 456,
465 [195 P.2d 842] ; Estate of Hampton, 55 Ca1.App.2d 543.
559-562 [131 P.2d 565] ; In re Soderberg, 26 Ariz. 404 [226
P. 210, 211]; cf., May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 [73
S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221].) The severing of a relationship
or an adjudication that it never existed for the purpose of
establishing the parties' freedom from it in the future is not
the same thing, however, as creating it or establishing its
present existence. (See Fre.ser, Jurisdi~tion by Necessity.
100 Univ. of Pa.L.Rev. 305, 312.) Thus it has been recog'
nized that a decree of divorce is a judgment in rem only
to the extent it determines that the parties are thereafter
free to remarry and is in personam to the extent it determines
that a marriage existed at the time it was entered. (Rediker
v. Rediker, 35 Ca1.2d 796, 800-801 (221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d
1152].) Basically the difference is between the state's power
to insulate its domiciliary from a relationship with one not
within its jurisdiction and its lack of power to reach out
and fasten a relationship upon a person over whom it has no
jurisdiction. (See Dodd, Jurisdi~tion in Personal Actions, 23
Ill.L.Rev. 427, 439.)
[6] Plaintiff correctly concedes that if the purpose of the
present action were to enforce a duty of support or some
other personal obligation growing out of the parent-child
relationship, personal jurisdiction over defendant would be
essential. (See Baldwin v. Baldwin. 28 Ca1.2d 406, 415 (170
P.2d 670]; In re Hindi, 71 Ariz. 17 [222 P.2d 991, 993].)
[7] This requirement cannot be avoided by limiting the relief
sought to a binding adjudication of the parties t status, since
such an adjudication would prevent relitigation of the basic
issue on which defendant's personal obligations to plaintiff
must rest and to that extent would necessarily constitute a
personal judgment against him. (See In re Hindi, supra;
Rediker v. Rediker, supra.)· [8] Moreover, the fact that it
-It is unnecessary to determine whether, given personal jurisdiction
over both of the parties, a judgment establishing the parent·child rela·
tionship would be in rem so as to be binding on third parties less directly
eoncemed with the question in issue. (See 2 Armstrong, California
~ Law 818·919.)
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may appear unlikely that plaintiff will ever have occasion
to assert any personal rights against defendant based on
the claimed relationship between them cannot justify giving
any judgment that might be obtained an e1iect to which it
would otherwise not be entitled.
Although there is language in Urquhart v. Urquhart, 185
Misc. 915 [57 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737], and in Fordham v. Marrero.
273 F. 61, 67, that supports the contention that a child's
status may be determined without personal jurisdiction over
his alleged parent, the holding in neither case is inconsistent
with the conclusion we have reached here. Thus, in the
Urquhart case the absent parent attacked the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter rather than over his person.
Moreover, the action was brought against both of the parents
and one of them was subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Accordingly, there was clearly jurisdiction to award part of
the relief sought and it was appropriate that the absent parent
be given notice of the action, whether or not he would be
bound by the adjudication. In the Fordham case the determination of parentage was ancillary to the administration
of an estate subject to the court's jurisdiction, and the court
had power to determine the question of heirship without·
securing personal jurisdiction over all of the parties. (See
Estate of Wise, 34 Ca1.2d 376. 385 [210 P.2d 497].)
The question remains whether plaintiff is entitled to maintain this action despite the court's lack of power to make a
binding determination that he is defendant's child without
personal jurisdiction over defendant. Plaintiff is primarily
concerned with establishing his true identity and reducing or
eliminating the evidentiary effect of his alleged false birth
certificate (see Vanderln"lt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J.Eq. 910 [67
A. 97, 99, 14 L.R.A.N.S. 304]) to facilitate his dealings with
military and other governmental officials. .[9] It has been
recognized that even when it is not res judicata, a determination of pedigree may constitute evidence of the facts adjudicated (Morecroft v. Taylor, 225 App.Div. 562 [234 N.Y.S.
2, 6]; see Health & Saf. Code, §§ 10600-10607; I'll, re Lee
Fang Fook, 74 F.Supp. 68, 71; Casares-Moreno v. United
States, 226 F.2d 873. 874: Bayse, Determination of Heirship,
54 Mich.L.Rev. 737, 747-749), and such a determination may
be sufficient to satisfy governmental authorities that require
for one purpose or another satisfactory evidence of birth and
identity. [10] Moreover, the fact that it might be used as

)
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evidence in subsequent litigation would not constitute a denial
of due process just as the use of any public record based on
ex parte statements would not.1i [11] Accordingly, it must
be determined whether section 231 may reasonably be interpreted as authorizing an action to secure a judgment the
e1iect of which would necessarily be limited to constituting
evidence of the facts adjudicated. We have concluded that
it may not. By its express terms it provides for an action
"between the parties" for the declaration of "the existence
or nonexistence . . . of the relation of parent and child, by
birth or adoption," and normally the judgment in such an
action would be res judicata. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1908.)
[12] In the present case, however, the judgment could not
have that e1iect in whole or in part in the absence of personal
jurisdiction over defendant. It could not, as in the case o!
an ex parte divorce, conclusively adjudicate the future relationship of the parties to one another (see Rediker v. Rediker,
supra, 35 Cal.2d 796, 802), and its purpose is not to adjudicate any interest in defendant's property located in this state.
In the latter situation it has been recognized that a judgment
obtained without personal jurisdiction is not even evidence
against the defendant except as it a1iects his interest in the
property involved (First Nat. Bank v. Eastman, 144 Cal.
487, 491-492 [77 P. 104~, 103 Am.St.Rep. 95, 1 Ann.Cas.
626] ; Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635, 641 [35 P. 433, 38
Am.St.Rep. 314]), and there is no basis for assuming that in
making general provisions for various types of actions the
Legislature intended that final judgments obtained without
personal jurisdiction should have purely evidentiary e1iect
in some cases but not in others. There is nothing in the
language of section 231 that suggests that actions thereunder
should be treated di1ierently from other actions in this respect,
and it is significant that in the Health and Safety Code the
Legislature has made provision for the securing of evidentiary
records of vital statistics by means of ex parte judicial and
administrative procedures. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 1057510578; 10600-10607; 10615-10618; see also Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2084, subdivision 2 [perpetuation of testimony with respect
to questions of pedigree].) Whether plainti1i may invoke
any of these procedures to secure the evidence he desires is
·Code of Civil Procedure, section 585, subdivision S provides that before a default judgment mny be entered in a proceeding of tbis sort, the
court must "require proof to be made of the allegations of ~e complaint.' ,
\
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a question not before us in this proceeding. The existence of
such remedies, however, even though they may not provide
relief in all circumstances, fortifies the conclusion that section
231 contemplates only an ordinary civil action. Since under
the circumstances of this case, personal jurisdiction over
defendant is essential for such an action, the service uPQn him
outside the state was ineffective.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed for.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.
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